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 
Abstract— The security and privacy issues of vehicular 
ad-hoc networks (VANETs) must be addressed before they 
are implemented. For this purpose, several academic and 
industrial proposals have been developed. Given that 
several of them are intended to co-exist, it is necessary that 
they consider compatible security models. This paper 
presents a survey on the underlying security models of 41 
recent proposals. Four key aspects in VANET security are 
studied, namely trust on vehicles, trust on infrastructure 
entities, existence of trusted third parties and attacker 
features. Based on the survey analysis, a basic mechanism 
to compare VANET security models is also proposed, thus 
highlighting their similarities and differences. 
 
Index Terms—Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), security 
model, trust. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are a new 
communication scenario in which vehicles can exchange 
information. VANETs are one of the enabling technologies of 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs).   
One of the main aspects of ITSs is that security and privacy 
issues must be addressed before their implementation. For this 
purpose, in recent times several academic and industrial 
proposals have been developed. They cover the main security 
requirements, namely anonymity/privacy, data integrity, sender 
authentication, data trust and availability. On the other hand, 
different standards that address these issues have been 
approved. Among them, IEEE 1609.2 [42] and ISO 21217 
[43] are the most representative ones.  
Several ITS services may be offered at the same time to 
each vehicle. To achieve this goal, it is necessary that these 
services are based on compatible security models, i.e. a 
common set of assumptions that enable them to be coexistent. 
For example, if a service requires the vehicle to be identified 
with a permanent identifier, whereas another one imposes that 
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the vehicle has only a set of pseudonyms, it is not possible to 
have both services at the same time. The situation gets worse 
when standards are taken into account. Usually assumptions 
are made without considering these norms and potentially 
creating a conflict with their terms.  
Taking into account the previous facts, it is necessary to 
establish a clear view on the assumptions that are made, in 
order to verify the compatibility of different proposals. The 
goal of this work is to perform a survey on the assumptions 
that form the underlying security model of different proposals. 
The survey is performed over a sample of 41 contributions 
from the last six years, thus presenting an overview of recent 
works. This survey focuses on key aspects of these models, 
namely trust on vehicles and infrastructure nodes, existence of 
trusted third parties and attacker features. Based on the survey 
results, a simple mechanism to compare models is proposed, 
thereby highlighting their similarities and differences. This is a 
first step towards an in-depth compatibility evaluation of these 
models.  
Paper organization. Section II gives a background on 
vehicular ad-hoc networks and their related security issues. 
Section III provides an overview of the survey and its scope. 
Section IV presents the results of the survey performed over a 
sample of 41 papers. Section V describes the related security 
issues as defined in representative standards. Section VI 
discusses the results obtained from the survey and compares 
them to the mandates of standards. Section VII presents the 
basic approach to compare proposals based on their security 
models. Finally, Section VIII describes the related work and 
Section IX concludes the paper. 
 
II. BACKGROUND. VEHICULAR AD-HOC NETWORKS AND 
SECURITY NEEDS 
In this Section, a brief overview of the main elements 
appearing on Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) is given, 
along with the security-related needs usually considered in 
these networks.  
 
A. Basic scheme 
Several entities are usually assumed in VANETs (Figure 1). 
Typically, one or more vehicles are connected to one or more 
static nodes (called Road-Side Units, RSUs) in order to 
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exchange information with them or with a set of infrastructure 
nodes. Given the nature of these entities, two different contexts 
may be identified, namely the infrastructure context (in which 
RSUs connect to infrastructure nodes) and the ad-hoc one 
(where vehicles and RSUs are connected). 
  
 
Fig. 1.  Overview of a vehicular network. Elements covered in this survey are 
highlighted  
 
Those entities managing the traffic or offering an external 
service are placed in the infrastructure context. Thus, the legal 
authority, the set of service providers and even vehicle 
manufacturers belong to this environment. Depending on their 
trustworthiness they may be considered as Trusted Third 
Parties (TTPs), that is, entities that are fully reliable for their 
context of operation.  
In the ad-hoc environment, sporadic communications take 
place to and from vehicles. For this purpose, vehicles are 
equipped with a communications unit (called OBU, On-Board 
Unit). They also have a set of in-vehicle sensors that enable 
them to measure their immediate environment and their own 
status. In order to process this information, computational 
devices and storage units are also assumed to be present in 
vehicles.  
 
B. Security and privacy needs 
VANETs, as any other communication network, require a 
set of security and privacy needs to be fulfilled in order to 
ensure a successful use and public acceptance [48], [49].    
One key aspect in these networks is the existing trade-off 
between liability and privacy. Thus, it is necessary not only to 
uniquely identify each communicating node, but also to 
authenticate it. In this way, it is possible to determine the 
liability for a malicious action (e.g. vehicles sending bogus 
information). A related security need is non-repudiation, 
which ensures that an entity performing an action will not be 
able to deny having done it.  
Nevertheless, privacy preservation is critical in these 
networks. It must be impossible for an unauthorized party to 
trace the path followed by a given vehicle. This need is present 
in all location-based services [52]. What is particular of 
VANETs is that the attacker must not be able to link a 
vehicle’s identity with that of its driver/owner. This guarantee 
must remain unless a malicious action is committed.   
Related to information security, there are three main needs. 
First, confidentiality (i.e. ensuring that messages will only be 
accessed by the intended parties) is required in some private 
services, like location-based ones. Secondly, data integrity 
ensures that they have not been altered since their creation. 
Even beyond, the third need is related to guaranteeing data 
trust, i.e. data are fresh, updated and reliable. 
The last need is availability, which implies that every node 
must be able to timely process and send the required 
information. Nevertheless, this is a general requirement as its 
fulfillment depends on the resource-saving design of the 
mechanisms that provide the remaining services. 
III. SURVEY OVERVIEW AND SCOPE 
The survey presented in this paper covers the different 
VANET elements over which assumptions are commonly 
made (Figure 1). Particularly, the security of the main VANET 
entities (namely vehicles, RSUs, infrastructure nodes and 
attackers) will be considered. A general view on the survey 
contents is presented in Figure 2. The choice of the aspects to 
be studied comes from an in-depth analysis of the selected 
works. The aim is to choose those issues that are usually 
subject to different assumptions, thus leading to diverse (even 
contradictory) scenarios. 
 
Fig. 2.  Survey contents overview  
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assume that they are untrusted, others suppose that they have 
different degrees of tamper protection. Furthermore, on top of 
this trust some interesting security properties (e.g. secure 
storage) may be offered. Their existence is analyzed as well.  
Due to the needs of authentication, privacy and 
confidentiality in this environment, the different types of 
vehicular credentials are also surveyed. A broad overview on 
the plethora of cryptographic approaches that are being 
proposed in this context is given. Furthermore, one 
controversial aspect that is also surveyed is their management 
process and particularly their creation. From classical, 
centralized approaches to fully decentralized ones, different 
settings are studied.  
Concerning infrastructure entities, it will be analyzed which 
of them are considered as trusted. In such a case, they are 
commonly referred to as Trusted Third Parties (TTPs). The 
focus is on their nature, as some works assume that they are 
related with the Government while others base on their 
independence. Furthermore, other transportation-related 
stakeholders (like service providers) are considered TTPs in 
some proposals. 
Regarding the attacker, three key aspects are covered –  
what it can do (e.g. inject packets), where it is placed (e.g. in 
vehicles) and which is its dimension (e.g. if honest majority is 
assumed).   
 
A. Limitations 
Three security-related aspects are left out of the scope of 
this survey. First, credentials of RSUs are not reviewed herein, 
as this matter is less challenging from the research point of 
view. There are two reasons behind this decision. On the one 
hand, RSUs have higher computational resources than 
vehicles, which enable them to use a wider amount of 
cryptographic primitives. On the other hand, RSUs are 
assumed to be supervised by the road traffic authority, thus 
enabling an easier credential management procedure.  
Secondly, sensor trust is not addressed, as they have low 
reliability in vehicles (see [50]) and they are not so relevant in 
RSUs. The only exception is on the time source, which may be 
seen as a specific type of sensor. Having reliable time 
information is a premise for the development of some security-
related mechanisms, so it is worth studying. 
Last but not least, connections between RSUs and 
infrastructure nodes or vehicles (recall Figure 1) are not 
addressed since their security profile is usually the same. Thus, 
connection with infrastructure is frequently considered 
reliable, as it may be protected with well-known mechanisms 
taken from regular communication networks. In practice, it 
means that it is a confidential, authenticated channel in which 
data integrity is preserved (e.g. [5], [9]). On the other hand, 
connection with vehicles is usually unreliable and untrusted – 
data may get lost or even maliciously modified. 
 
IV. REVIEW ON SECURITY MODELS 
In this Section, a revision of the security models considered 
in VANET-related recent works is presented.  Section IV-A 
addresses the security of the vehicular devices and credentials 
(Figure 1, left part), whereas Section IV-B focuses on that of 
road-side units (Figure 1, right part). Section IV-C introduces 
the assumptions on a particular set of infrastructure nodes 
(Figure 1, upper part), called Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), 
which are relevant for the security matters. Finally, Section IV-
D describes the nature and capabilities of considered attackers 
(Figure 1, lower part). 
For the sake of clarity, each of the following Sections have 
an accompanying Table in which a detailed view of each issue 
is presented for all considered works. These Tables are 
organized following the structure presented in Figure 2. 
Particularly, columns are separated according to that structure 
whereas each row describes one considered proposal. To 
improve the work readability, all tables have been placed in 
the Appendix. 
 
A. Analysis on vehicle-related assumptions 
This Section focuses on the assumptions made over 
vehicular devices and credentials. With respect to devices, the 
analysis on their trust will address both its physical (built-in) 
protection as well as the offered security services. These issues 
are summarized in Table I. With respect to credentials, both 
their creation and their type will be studied. Table II 
summarizes these issues for the works at stake. 
 
1) Trust: One of the most significant aspects of the survey 
is that most contributions (22 out of 41 proposals) do not 
detail the required trustworthiness on the vehicular side. It 
must be noted that the reviewed works are focused on 
providing security services over vehicular networks. For this 
purpose, they make use of cryptographic operations and they 
manage private data. Therefore, having an explicit degree of 
trust in the vehicular side seems to be mandatory in all 
proposals. Despite this fact, the proposal in [7] states that the 
vehicle may be completely untrusted. Nevertheless, according 
to their description this statement is not accurate, as at least the 
storage of credentials must be protected against illegal access.  
Among the proposals that describe this trust, most of them 
(11 out of 19) assume that reliable storage is provided. A 
lower amount (9 out of 19) rely on the assumption about 
reliable cryptographic processing, whereas only a small 
fraction (5 out of 19) consider that there is a reliable time 
source.  
The previous figures also contain those proposals in which 
it is stated that vehicular devices are fully trusted. In these 
cases, it has been assumed that there is a Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM). According to [47], this device provides with 
secure storage, cryptographic computation and an internal 
reliable clock.  
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Apart from the general features of these devices, the extent 
of physical protection against tampering has also been 
analyzed. Particularly, there are some contributions (8 out of 
19) which are based on tamper-resistant hardware, that is, a 
component which is able to actively react to a physical 
manipulation. Smart cards (used in [27]) and TPMs are 
examples of this family of devices. On the other hand, a 
smaller amount (6 proposals out of 19) consider tamper-proof 
device, which only gives evidence on such a malicious 
alteration.   
Despite the existence of the aforementioned devices, in [11] 
it is stated that cryptographic operations are not carried out by 
this device. Instead, a processing unit (not explicitly trusted) 
performs them. In a similar way, [41] performs decryption and 
a generation of a cryptographic policy tree in the On-Board 
Unit (OBU). It must be noted that in the aforementioned paper, 
trust assumptions are made over the tamper-proof device, but 
not over the OBU. 
One important point is that none of the revised approaches 
makes assumptions on the trustworthiness of the internal 
communication networks. Thus, despite the assumption of 
having secure storage, in absence of a trusted internal network 
it could happen that maliciously forged information is securely 
stored. 
 
2) Credentials: Vehicular credentials enable the 
electronic identification and authentication of the vehicle 
within the network and the provided services. As a difference 
with vehicular trust assumptions, only two proposals ([3], 
[38]) do not include any consideration on this issue. The 
remaining ones have specified the required type of credential. 
Nevertheless, a category has been included to classify future 
works that do not make use of credentials (e.g. reasoning 
mechanisms over sensorial data). 
One important difference between all proposals is the 
procedure to create these cryptographic materials. A 
significant amount of them (18 works) propose a combined 
approach in which vehicles or RSUs are enabled by the 
authority to perform this operation. Afterwards, this material is 
certified by the authority. The other two alternatives are a fully 
centralized approach in which a trusted authority generates 
these materials (13 proposals) and a fully distributed 
architecture, in which vehicles create them (7 proposals).  
Concerning identification, 17 proposals make use of a single 
identifier which remains unchanged over time. As this 
identifier could enable following the path of the affected 
vehicle (tracking), an alternative taken by 4 works is the use of 
pseudonyms. Other group of 4 proposals use attributes to 
identify the vehicle, either permanent ones (e.g. make, model) 
or temporary ones such as its localization. The use of a public 
value as identifier (which is the base of Identity-based 
cryptography) is present in 2 proposals.  
With respect to the authentication, the most noteworthy 
assumption (26 articles) is the use of public key cryptography 
– there is a pair of public-private keys, being the public key 
associated to the corresponding certificate. In fact, the most 
common choice among them (16 out of 26 proposals) is the 
creation of a pool of pseudonym-based, short-lived 
certificates. The rest of works based on public key 
cryptography either avoid the use of certificates (8 articles) or 
use anonymous certificates (3 proposals).  It must be noted that 
the aforementioned use of identity-based cryptography is 
opposed to the public key one, as there are no explicit 
certificate management procedures. 
Among the remaining authentication mechanisms, 5 
proposals make use of a group key. The same amount 
considers that the vehicle stores a private, unique key. Also, 5 
works are based on the use of a session key. 
B. Analysis on RSU-related assumptions 
Even if a significant amount of the analyzed contributions 
(13 articles) do not assume that RSUs are in place, most of the 
surveyed works make an active use of this element. This 
Section introduces the assumptions on trust related to RSUs. 
Table III summarizes the different issues considered for each 
paper.  
As it happened with vehicular devices, RSUs usually 
perform cryptographic operations in the considered proposals. 
Despite their implication on the proposed approaches, it is 
noteworthy that a significant amount of works (14 out of 41) 
do not detail the trustworthiness of RSUs. This set of articles is 
formed by those that mention the existence of RSUs but do not 
give any detail on their implication and trust. Besides, 4 works 
assume that RSUs are untrusted. 
With respect to the remaining contributions, a small fraction 
of them (6 articles) consider RSUs to be fully trusted. As it 
happened with vehicles, this issue has been reflected as if they 
were equipped with a tamper-resistant hardware that provides 
with secure storage, processing and time information. Taking 
into account this decision, each feature is considered 
independently in different proposals – 9 assume that RSUs 
perform reliable cryptographic processing, the same amount 
consider reliable storage and a smaller amount (6 works) 
suppose the existence of a trusted time source. 
From the physical point of view, apart from tamper-resistant 
hardware, 3 works consider that RSUs are equipped with a 
tamper-proof device. In order to reduce the trust level, in [7] 
RSUs are semi-trusted in that they operate as expected but they 
can leak data. 
C. Analysis on TTP-related assumptions 
Except from 5 proposals, most revised ones assume the 
existence of different trusted third parties (TTPs). The most 
common party is a Certification Authority (CA) assumed in 23 
works (see Table IV). Apart from the centralized, fully trusted 
CAs, there are other variants – it may be distributed among 
different entities (e.g. [35]) or it may be semi-trusted [31]. 
Other two usual entities are a generic trusted authority which 
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appears in 12 contributions and a government-related authority 
that is assumed in 6 articles. 
The proposals that make use of the concept of group of 
vehicles usually assume that there is an entity different from 
the CA that manages the group. This entity is usually referred 
to as Group Manager and appears in 3 contributions. This role 
may be spread in two different entities, called Membership 
Manager and Tracing Manager, to share responsibility and 
reduce the chance of performing malicious actions [20]. 
In some cases, the revised approaches also rely on the 
existence of two real-world entities related to the vehicular 
context – vehicle manufacturers ([34]) and service providers 
([26]), being these providers in charge of offering an ITS-
related service. It must be noted that these entities are usually 
not fully trusted, but they act as such in the proposed 
approaches. 
D. Analysis on attacker-related assumptions 
The type of attacker considered in a given security model is 
a significant aspect, since it points out the degree of threat that 
must be countered. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify which 
malicious actions can be performed. Furthermore, it must be 
stated the scope of the attacker. This scope is determined by 
the attacker’s nature (i.e. if it is placed in one or more 
vehicles/RSUs) and dimension (i.e. whether it acts 
independently or may collude, its degree of presence and 
coverage). Both the attacker capabilities and its scope are 
introduced below.  
1) Attacker capabilities. Seven main threats against the 
security needs presented in Section II-B have been identified. 
They are related to the information security (eavesdropping, 
modification, injection), to the entities’ privacy (tracking, 
impersonation), to the availability (jam) or to the physical 
integrity (OBU hacking). Each of these threats is shown in a 
column of Table V, under the “Capabilities” heading. Given 
that in order to perform tracking it is necessary to eavesdrop, 
both issues are presented in the same column in that table. 
The most common capability is to perform eavesdropping 
and impersonation, both appearing in 21 proposals. It seems 
reasonable since these actions may lead to risks that are 
especially relevant in the vehicular context – tracking vehicles 
and creating the illusion of a group of vehicles from a single 
one.  
A lower but significant amount of works (18 proposals), 
consider that the attacker may inject or replay packets in the 
communications network. On the other hand, a similar amount 
(15 proposals) assume that it may forge or erase information. 
These results illustrate that a significant portion of the research 
community is aware of the existing risks in the vehicular 
communication channel. It must be recalled that this is a 
wireless, shared medium in which any nearby entity can have 
access. However, paper [3] assumes that injection cannot be 
performed by the attacker.  
The threats of jamming and physical hacking of the 
vehicular devices are only present in a small fraction of works 
– 6 and 4 articles, respectively. Furthermore, the proposal in 
[35] assumes that both threats cannot be performed.  The low 
amount of contributions addressing these issues may be due to 
two main reasons. First, both threats do not affect to a single 
piece of information or entity, but to all of them. They affect to 
the global chance of communication. The second reason, 
which applies particularly to jamming, is that it may be 
alleviated through a suitable design of the remaining security 
mechanisms that involve communication. 
Taking into account these issues, most surveyed proposals 
assume that these threats have already been addressed instead 
of particularly countering them. This is usually done by citing 
a previous work that faces this issue. As an example, paper 
[18] which tackles these threats has been already cited more 
than 140 times according to Google Scholar.  
2) Attacker scope: nature and dimension. The scope of 
the attacker is only stated in a discrete amount of the surveyed 
works (17 out of 41). Concerning its nature, 6 proposals 
assume that it is placed in vehicles whereas only 2 consider 
that it acts in RSUs.  
The amount of attackers and how they interact is given by 
its dimension properties. In this study, three issues have been 
considered. First, 8 papers state that there are several 
adversaries and that they can collude, whereas the proposal in 
[34] assumes no collusion. The second factor is the density of 
adversaries, being the assumption of honest majority present in 
6 articles. The last factor is the attacker coverage, in which 4 
contributions assume that it may have global coverage. It must 
be noted that in these works it would be reasonable to have a 
lack of indications on the attacker nature -- it should be 
deployed over the whole network in order to have a global 
action range. However, the works in [7] and [13] specify that it 
is placed in vehicles. 
 
V. STANDARDS POSITION ON SECURITY MODELS 
There are two sets of standard families that are relevant to 
the security field. On the one hand, CALM (Communication 
Access for Land Mobiles) standards are being defined by ISO. 
Among them, ISO 21217 defines the general architecture 
including the security issues [43]. Within this norm, two 
security-related documents1, namely ISO 11776 and ISO 
11769 are cited. These are technical reports that cover the 
security considerations for lawful interception and data 
retention [44], [45]. These issues are required to support the 
work of enforcement agencies. Particularly, they define how 
interception must be performed and for how long data must be 
retained. These requirements are related to how the service 
provider may operate, but they do not make assumptions or 
statements over vehicular devices, RSUs, TTPs or attackers.  
A similar situation happens with the technical report ISO 
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12859 (not mentioned in [43]), which covers privacy in 
intelligent transportation systems. Besides the fact that ISO’s 
technical reports are informative (i.e. not normative), this 
document only contains recommendations over the elements 
considered in this work. As an example, this document states 
that special attention must be put on the storage, transmission 
and processing of information, providing the required access 
control. In sum, this is a design goal and not a decision that 
defines the security of each element at stake.   
The second family of standards is the WAVE (Wireless 
Access in Vehicular Environments) one developed by IEEE. 
Among them, IEEE 1609.2 is the one focused on security 
issues [42]. IEEE 1609.0 will describe the general 
architecture, but it is still under development.  
Considering the previous facts, the two references that have 
strong relationship with security models are ISO 21217 and 
IEEE 1609.2. Each one will be introduced in the following 
subsections. 
A. ISO 21217 
ISO 21217 describes the common architectural framework 
of CALM-compliant ITS stations. These stations may be 
located at vehicles, RSUs, centralized entities or personal 
devices such as cell phones.  
In general words, each station may be divided into one or 
more internal components. This standard determines that there 
is a security module inside each of these components. This 
module manages three elements – first, the firewall and 
intrusion detection system; second, the authentication, 
authorization and profile management module; and third, the 
identity, certificates and cryptographic material. It also 
contains the functionality provided by a Hardware Security 
Module (HSM), although the capabilities offered by this 
device are not clarified. 
Despite the existence of such a component, the current 
version of this standard does not contain its specification. 
These details will be added in a future revision, as the 
development of security functionality is under consideration by 
ISO/TC 204 (WG 16). Nevertheless, according to the current 
text and the use of HSMs it is possible to devise that this 
standard will state that all ITS stations need to provide with 
reliable storage (at least of the material cited in the previous 
paragraph) and reliable cryptographic processing. The type of 
built-in security (e.g. tamper-proof, tamper-resistance) is not 
clear according to the current document wording. It should be 
noted that the existence of these internal security components 
does not imply any kind of particular implementation -- they 
may be implemented in a single device or split across several 
ones. 
                                                                                                     
1 A third document, ISO 13181, was cited in this standard and mentioned 
as a preliminary work item [46]. However, it has not evolved towards a 
normative document. 
B. IEEE 1609.2 
The scope of this standard includes describing the 
administrative functions necessary to support the core security 
operations. Therefore, it specifies the security services offered 
for applications and WAVE-related management messages.  
The considered generic security services are confidentiality, 
authentication, authorization and integrity. In order to perform 
the related cryptographic operations (i.e. signature, 
encryption), the standard assumes public key certificates along 
with their related private keys. Annex E of this standard 
comments on the type of certificates considered. Particularly, 
it is stated that anonymous certificates are not addressed in this 
revision, as there is the need to trace back malicious parties. 
However, the use of pseudonyms (introduced as identifiers 
used by a WAVE device that do not link to its real-world 
identity) within certificates is mandated by this norm. Each 
network node (i.e. vehicle or RSU) has to store several 
keypairs. In order to refer to a concrete keypair, an identifier 
called Cryptomaterial Handle is used.  
In order to manage revocation, Certificate Revocation Lists 
(CRLs) are in use. They will be considered by the Certificate 
Management Entity, which will assess the trustworthiness and 
validity of a given certificate. 
As it happens in ISO 21217, this standard does not define 
the physical security required. Interestingly, it is mentioned 
that it does not provide primitives that may be used to extract 
the private key from a Cryptomaterial Handle. This issue 
implies that this (potentially malicious) action may be 
performed physically, but no logical mechanisms are offered. 
As a difference with the aforementioned standard, the use of 
secure devices (e.g. hardware security module) is not 
mentioned in this document. 
With respect to the information security services, the 
standard specifies how cryptomaterial must be loaded and 
used. However, the mention pointed out in the previous 
paragraph allows discarding that secure storage is provided2. 
Similarly, no indications are given over the security of the 
context in which cryptographic processing is carried out. 
Therefore, the existence of secure processing is not ensured. 
Regarding the potential reliable time source, Annex E clarifies 
that this document does not impose accuracy requirements for 
the time source. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This Section analyzes the different findings introduced in 
previous sections concerning recent VANET-related 
contributions and standards. Particularly, Section VI-A shows 
the relevance of the considered sample of contributions, thus 
ensuring that it gives an unbiased, broad overview of security 
 
2 Annex E of this standard also mentions that implementations should 
protect private keys for being trivially revealed (e.g. stored unencrypted on 
disk) and for being used in an unauthorized way. In the authors’ opinion, this 
is not a proper requirement for a secure storage environment. 
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trends in this research field. On the other hand, Section VI-B 
discusses the situation found concerning security models and 
their compatibility. 
 
A. Survey relevance 
This survey covers 41 works, which are distributed within 
the last 6 years. The only exception is paper [16], which is 
from 2004. It has been selected because of its high impact 
(more than 270 cites according to Google Scholar). Figure 3 
shows the distribution of articles for each year. It may be seen 
that a representative sample exist for each one. 
 
Fig. 3.  Distribution of articles per year  
 
Concerning the nature of the analyzed works, it covers both 
conferences and journals (Figure 4). Particularly, the sample is 
composed by almost half (23 out of 41) of conferences, being 
the other half (18 out of 41) formed by journals. Among 
journals, most of them correspond to indexed ones in 
Thomson’s Journal Citation Report, which is considered as a 
relevant index for measuring the journal impact. Only one 
journal is not listed in the aforementioned ranking. 
 
Fig. 4.  Distribution of articles per type  
 
To ensure that the selected works cover all aspects of 
security and privacy, the goal of each approach must be 
analyzed. For this purpose, the main security requirements, 
namely anonymity, confidentiality, sender authentication, data 
integrity, non-repudiation, availability, data trust and privacy 
have been considered. Other important security requirements 
such as access control or receiver authentication have been left 
out of the analysis as they are not usual in recent approaches 
within this research field. As seen on Figure 5, each service is 
covered by more than 10 proposals, which seems to be a 
representative value. The only exception is the availability 
service, which is explicitly addressed by 3 proposals. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that most research efforts in 
these networks implicitly intend to provide this availability. 
Computational resources of vehicles, along with the potential 
bottlenecks in centralized entities, call for lightweight 
mechanisms. 
 
Fig. 5.  Distribution of security services covered by the selected articles  
 
B. Discussion 
Considering the conducted survey, it is clear that a huge 
amount of different security models have been proposed in 
recent literature. They are formed by different choices in each 
of the issues concerning vehicles, RSUs, TTPs and attackers. 
 Taking into account the revision of the trust in vehicles and 
RSUs, a key conclusion is that a noteworthy portion of works 
does not include these considerations. As a consequence, these 
issues remain unclear and thus it is not possible to perform a 
holistic security analysis over these proposed mechanisms. 
Even worse, it may lead to practical, real-world 
implementations in which vulnerabilities are discovered due to 
this lack of security specification. Note that these security 
threats may affect to the provision of services, potentially 
leading to safety dangers in the vehicles at stake. 
Different types of TTPs have been found in the considered 
works. This fact has two undesirable consequences. On the one 
hand, some approaches are not benefiting from having more 
TTPs than those considered. On the other hand, it may happen 
that the same entity is required to be trusted for one approach 
whereas it is untrusted for another one. In the latter case, this 
causes the total incompatibility among proposals. 
With respect to attackers, a significant amount of 
combinations of capabilities, placement and dimension have 
been found. Even if there are usual capabilities (like 
eavesdropping or impersonation), other attacks are only 
sparingly considered. The worst consequence is that in the 
absence of a complete, holistic security analysis for a given 
proposal, weaknesses may be found due to the attacker 
features not considered yet. Even worse, when several 
approaches are combined and only one of them is protected 
against a given attack, the resulting combination may be 
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vulnerable. For example, if one proposal prevents tracking but 
it is not considered by the other one, the result is that tracking 
may be performed and that protective actions carried out by 
the first approach are useless. 
On the other hand, standards offer a particular choice for 
several of these components. Thus, standard IEEE 1609.2 calls 
for the use of public key certificates, which has a direct 
implication over the required cryptomaterial. Concerning 
standard ISO 21217, it specifies the use of HSMs which will 
enable the provision of secure processing and storage. 
Considering the surveyed works, these decisions are in conflict 
with assumptions made in some proposals.  
Taking into account the previous facts, it may be concluded 
that there is an urgent need to agree on a set of common 
settings in order to achieve reliable and interoperable security 
and privacy services. This situation will lead to a set of 
enhanced Intelligent Transport System (ITS) services that can 
co-exist in a single vehicular environment. In this way, efforts 
taken by researchers and industry will be aligned, thus 
promoting an earlier and more mature development of ITS 
environments. Note that without compatibility among their 
underlying models, different ITS services may not be used at 
the same time. 
VII. BASIC APPROACH TO COMPARE SECURITY MODELS 
Considering the discussion presented in Section VI-B, it is 
necessary to work towards a common (or, at least, compatible) 
framework for security models in this field.  
In order to address this issue, the use of a systematic 
classification of security models may help to clarify the 
similarities and differences between contributions. In this way, 
it will be clearer whether two mechanisms are built over a 
common set of assumptions, thus ensuring their compatibility. 
At the same time, it may help on identifying those proposals 
that, although built on different assumptions, may be co-
existent. Furthermore, it will highlight the choices made on 
each aspect, thus contributing to avoid the lack of decisions 
over an issue, as it happened in several surveyed works.  
Based on the different categories identified along the 
survey, a simple approach to compare security models is 
proposed herein. The approach consists in building a 
comparison chart, in which each row is an analyzed feature 
(recall Figure 2) and each column represents a given work. 
Each cell is filled up with the corresponding values for each 
model feature in the considered proposal. Whenever two cells 
in a given row contain the same value, they are identified as 
compatible. This approach enables identifying the points of 
coincidence and divergence between contributions. Thus, it is 
a first step to clarify whether these proposals may co-exist or 
not, or even if they are fully similar or divergent. Enhancing 
this approach to introduce a fine-grained compatibility 
measure for those cases in which a given feature is not exactly 
the same among different articles is left to future work. 
To illustrate the proposed approach, Table VI compares 
papers [4], [28] and [34]. In this Table, highlighted cells 
contain the same value for a given feature. Thus, it may be 
seen that papers [28] and [34] make the same assumptions 
over the trust on vehicular devices, whereas this aspect is not 
defined in [4].  
Concerning vehicular credentials, they all tend to a partially 
distributed creation. Papers [28] and [34] are compatible in 
that they suppose that the vehicle stores a secret value. 
Nevertheless, [28] uses pseudonym-based certificates, which 
may (or may not) harm compatibility depending on the design 
of [34]. This situation highlights the need for the 
aforementioned planned enhancement. In any case, it is easy to 
observe that [28] and [4] are not compatible since the latter 
uses public key cryptography without certificates.  
Regarding RSUs, a common point of these approaches is 
that they do not consider the existence of these devices. This is 
the most suitable situation from the compatibility viewpoint.  
With respect to the existence of TTPs, this point is 
especially critical when an approach considers one entity to be 
trusted while another one does not. As this is not the case in 
these approaches, this issue does not raise great compatibility 
concerns. For example, [28] and [4] would be fully compatible 
if they are deployed in a scenario in which certificate 
management is supervised by a government-related entity. 
Even further, the three works could be co-existent (regarding 
TTPs) if vehicle manufacturers might be trusted without 
consequences over [28] and [4]. 
The attacker features are quite different in the studied 
proposals. Despite the differences on what the attacker can do, 
it is also noticeable that [34] assumes that it cannot collude. 
These differences on the attacker features discourage applying 
these proposals at the same time.  
As a consequence of this analysis, it has been shown that the 
proposed approach simplifies identifying the chance for 
different mechanisms to co-exist. In this way, it offers a 
suitable solution for the existing problem. 
VIII. RELATED WORK 
Security issues in vehicular ad-hoc networks have been 
extensively considered in previous works. As an example, 
Stampoulis and Chai performed a survey which contains an 
overview of security requirements, a description on 
adversaries and their attacks and an introduction to proposed 
countermeasures [48]. An up-to-date, holistic revision of these 
issues has been recently published [51]. Our work expands 
these works in three directions. First, the assumptions on 
trustworthiness of each node/device in recent works are 
revised. Second, the security-related considerations in 
standards are also described. Third, a proposal to compare 
different contributions regarding their security assumptions 
(i.e. models) is presented.   
Another security-related survey focused on the usual 
security requirements, their associated threats and the 
proposed contributions to successfully achieve these 
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requirements [49]. The work presented herein complements 
their vision – whereas that paper gives an overview on the set 
of proposed approaches, this survey focuses on the set of 
assumptions (i.e. underlying models) that form the basis of 
these approaches. It must be noted that without a clear vision 
on their assumptions, it is not easy to identify which 
approaches can be simultaneously applied. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Several elements compose the complex scenario of 
vehicular networks. Over these elements, different assumptions 
can be made to build a proposal (e.g. a mechanism, a protocol, 
a service, etc.). These assumptions form its underlying model. 
Given the significant amount of Intelligent Transport Systems 
services that may be offered at the same time within a single 
network, it is necessary to ensure that their models are 
compatible each other. This work has focused on security-
related models. Thus, a survey of the models of 41 security-
related works in vehicular networks has been presented. This 
survey has focused on the assumptions performed over the 
vehicular devices, Road-Side Units (RSUs), Trusted Third 
Parties and the attacker features.   
The analysis has shown the degree of differences existing in 
the revised works, thus leading to the undesirable scenario in 
which they cannot co-exist. Even worse, it has been identified 
that a significant portion of contributions do not clarify key 
aspects such as the trust of vehicular devices or RSUs. The 
view from the standards states the current technical mandates 
that should apply on each aspect. The analysis has shown that 
it contradicts usual assumptions on the revised proposals. 
Therefore, this survey aims to raise awareness on this issue in 
order to bring together standards and fully specified technical-
scientific contributions.  
In order to highlight the similarities and differences between 
models, a simple comparison approach has also been 
proposed. It gives an easy way to identify conflicting aspects, 
as a first step to solve them.  
Future work on this area will have two main directions. On 
the one hand, the amount of elements analyzed in this survey 
will be extended, introducing other issues that may have an 
impact over the global security. For example, the revocation 
management of vehicular credentials or the assumptions on 
RSUs interconnection will be studied. On the other hand, a 
measure of similarity will be designed to improve the proposed 
comparison mechanism. Thus, it will be possible to determine 
whether two proposals may co-exist even if they rely upon 
different security assumptions. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
TABLE I 
TRUST ON VEHICULAR DEVICES. HIGHLIGHTED ROWS DO NOT ADDRESS THIS 
ISSUE 
 1.1. Type of device 1.2. Features 
 1.1.0. 
Untrusted 
 
 
1.1.1. 
Tamper-
proof 
 
1.1.2. 
Tamper-
resistant 
 
1.2.1. 
Reliable 
crypto 
1.2.2. 
Reliable 
storage 
 
1.2.3. 
Reliable 
time 
source 
[1]     x x x   
[2]   x         
[3] x           
[4]             
[5]   x   x x   
[6]             
[7] x           
[8]       
[9]       
[10]   x   x x x 
[11]   x    x   
[12]     x       
[13]       
[14]       
[15]       
[16]       
[17]       
[18]   x x x  
[19]       
[20]       
[21]      x 
[22]       
[23]       
[24]      x 
[25]   x x x  
[26]  x     
[27]   x x x  
[28]   x x x x 
[29]       
[30]  NO NO    
[31]       
[32]       
[33]       
[34]   x x x x 
[35]   x  x  
[36]       
[37]       
[38]       
[39]       
[40]       
[41]  x  x x  
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TABLE II 
VEHICULAR CREDENTIALS. HIGHLIGHTED ROWS DO NOT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE 
 
 2.1. Creation 2.2. Nature 
 2.0. 
None 
 
2.1.1. 
Centra-
lized 
 
2.1.2. 
Partial 
distrib. 
(vehicles, 
RSU) 
 
2.1.3. 
Fully by 
vehicles 
 
2.2.1. 
Single 
identif. 
 
2.2.2. 
Pseudo-
nyms 
 
2.2.3. 
Public 
key 
crypto 
 
2.2.4. 
ID-based 
credential 
 
2.2.5. 
Attrib.- 
based 
crypto 
 
2.2.6. 
Vehicular 
secret 
value 
 
2.2.7. 
Session 
key 
 
2.2.8. 
Group 
key 
       2.2.3.1. 
Certif. 
(pseud.) 
 
2.2.3.2. 
Certif. 
(anony.) 
 
2.2.3.3 
No 
certif. 
     
[1]   x  x x      x   
[2]   x           x 
[3]               
[4]   x  x    x      
[5]    x  x   x    x  
[6]   x    x        
[7]  x     x        
[8]   x       x     
[9]   x     x       
[10]  x   x    x    x  
[11]   x  x   x   x    
[12]    x x   x       
[13]   x      x      
[14]   x      x      
[15]    x x          
[16]    x  x   x      
[17]   x  x  x  x     x 
[18]  x   x  x        
[19]  x     x        
[20]  x   x         x 
[21]          x     
[22]   x  x x        x 
[23]    x         x x 
[24]  x   x  x        
[25]  x     x        
[26]  x   x  x      x  
[27]   x  x  x      x  
[28]   x    x     x   
[29]    x     x      
[30]  x         x    
[31]   x  x  x        
[32]   x        x    
[33]  x   x  x        
[34]   x         x   
[35]  x   x  x        
[36]  x     x        
[37]    x   x        
[38]               
[39]  x     x        
[40]   x  x       x   
[41]   x        x x   
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TABLE III 
TRUST ON RSUS. HIGHLIGHTED ROWS DO NOT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE 
 3.0 
Abse
nt 
3.1 Type of device 3.2 Features 
  3.1.0. 
Un- 
trusted 
 
 
3.1.1. 
Tam-
per-
proof 
 
3.1.2. 
Tamper
-resist 
 
3.2.1. 
Reliab 
crypto 
3.2.2. 
Reliab. 
storage 
 
3.2.3. 
Reliab. 
time 
source 
[1]        
[2]        
[3] x       
[4] x       
[5]        
[6] x       
[7]     x NO  
[8]   x   x  
[9]  x    x  
[10]    x x x x 
[11]    x x x x 
[12]        
[13]   x  x x  
[14]  x      
[15] x       
[16] x       
[17]        
[18]        
[19] x       
[20]        
[21]  x      
[22]        
[23] x       
[24]        
[25] x       
[26]     x   
[27]    x x x x 
[28] x       
[29] x       
[30] x       
[31]        
[32]    x x x x 
[33]        
[34] x       
[35] x       
[36]  x      
[37]        
[38]        
[39]    x x x x 
[40]        
[41]   x x x x x 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE IV 
CONSIDERED TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES (TTPS) 
 4.0. 
None 
 
 
4.1. 
Certif-
related 
auth. 
 
 
4.2. 
Gover-
nment- 
related 
auth 
 
4.3. 
VANET
-related 
Auth. 
(e.g. 
group 
mngr.) 
4.4. 
Generic 
trusted 
auth. 
 
4.5. 
Serv. 
prov. 
 
4.6. 
Veh. 
manuf. 
[1]  x x  x   
[2]  x  x    
[3] x       
[4]   x     
[5]     x   
[6]  x   x   
[7]   x     
[8]   x  x   
[9]     x   
[10]     x   
[11]     x   
[12]  x      
[13]  x      
[14]  x   x   
[15]  NO      
[16] x       
[17]  x      
[18]  x      
[19]  x      
[20]  x x x    
[21]  x      
[22] x       
[23]    x    
[24]  x      
[25]  x      
[26]  x    x  
[27]     x   
[28]  x      
[29] x       
[30]  x      
[31]  x      
[32]     x   
[33]  x      
[34]   x    x 
[35]  x   x   
[36]  x      
[37]  x      
[38] x       
[39]  x      
[40]     x   
[41]  x      
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TABLE V 
ATTACKER MODEL. HIGHLIGHTED ROWS DO NOT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE 
 
 5.1. Capabilities 5.2. Scope: Nature 5.3. Scope:Dimension 
 5.1.1. 
Eavesdrop 
/tracking 
 
 
 
5.1.2. 
Modify 
/ Forge 
/ Erase 
5.1.3. 
Inject / 
Replay 
5.1.4. 
Impersonate 
/Identity 
manipulation 
 
5.1.5. 
Jam 
 
5.1.6. 
Credential 
stealing 
/ OBU 
hacking 
 
5.2.1. 
Vehicle 
 
5.2.2. 
RSU 
 
5.3.1. 
Can 
collude 
 
5.3.2. 
Honest 
majority 
 
5.3.3. 
Global 
coverage 
[1] x x   x       
[2] x x          
[3]  x NO         
[4]    x        
[5]    x      x  
[6]   x x     x x  
[7] x  x x   x  x  x 
[8]            
[9] x   x        
[10] x           
[11] x x x x       x 
[12] x x x         
[13] x x x x   x    x 
[14]  x x x        
[15] x   x        
[16]   x x     x   
[17]    x        
[18]  x x  x    x x  
[19]   x         
[20] x x x x       x 
[21]   x x    x    
[22] x           
[23] x   x        
[24]  x x  x     x  
[25]  x x         
[26]            
[27] x   x        
[28] x   x        
[29]  x x  x  x  x x  
[30]    x  x   x   
[31]   x x        
[32] x x x  x       
[33] x     x      
[34] x x x     x NO x  
[35] x    NO NO x     
[36]    x        
[37] x     x      
[38]  x x    x     
[39] x        x   
[40] x   x x       
[41]    x  x x  x   
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TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF SECURITY MODELS BASED ON SURVEYED FEATURES. HIGHLIGHTED CELLS CONTAIN THE SAME VALUES 
 
 [28] 
 
 
 
[34] [4] 
Trust on 
vehicular 
device 
1.1.2 (tamper-resistant);  
1.2.1. (reliable crypto);  
1.2.2. (reliable storage);  
1.2.3. (reliable time source) 
1.1.2 (tamper-resistant);  
1.2.1. (reliable crypto);  
1.2.2. (reliable storage);  
1.2.3. (reliable time source) 
Undefined 
Vehicular 
credentials 
2.1.2. (Partially distributed creation 
(in vehicles, RSUs)) ;  
2.2.3.1. (Public key crypto with certif 
(pseudonym)) ;  
2.2.6. (Vehicular secret value) 
2.1.2. (Partially distributed creation 
(in vehicles, RSUs));  
2.2.6. (Vehicular secret value) 
2.1.2. (Partially distributed creation 
(in vehicles, RSUs));  
2.2.1. (Single identifier);   
2.2.3.3. (Public key crypto without 
certif) 
Trust on RSU 3.0. (absent) 3.0. (absent) 3.0. (absent) 
TTPs 4.1. (Certificate-related authority) 4.2. (Government-related authority); 
4.6. (Veh. manufacturer) 
4.2.(Government-related authority) 
Attacker 
features 
5.1.1. (Eavesdrop / tracking) ; 
5.1.4. (Impersonate / Identity 
manipulation) 
5.1.1. (Eavesdrop / tracking) ; 
5.1.2. (Modify/Forge/Erase); 
5.1.3. (Inject / Replay);  
5.2.2. (RSU); 
NOT 5.3.1 (collusion);  
5.3.2. (Honest majority) 
5.1.4. (Impersonate / Identity 
manipulation) 
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